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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.

To: Director of Central Intelligence,
(Attn: Mr. Theodore Babbitt).

Subj: IM-341 - Political Alignments and Major Psychological Warfare
Vulnerabilities in the Event of War Before July 1951.

Ref: (a) CIA secret memo regarding subject study dtd 16 Nov 1950.

1. It is believed that "political alignments" and "psychological warfare vulnerabilities" are subjects for separate consideration. Although these subjects bear a certain interrelation, combined treatment is considered somewhat artificial, stressing psychological warfare vulnerabilities on pages 1-5 and degrees of alignment on pages 5-14. The combination is believed to result in a confusion of both factors which diminishes the usefulness of the paper.

2. It is recommended, therefore, that IM-341 be withdrawn and that consideration be given to separate treatment of each of these subjects in the following manner:

(a) A study of political alignments could be based on much of IM-341. This could then be used for various purposes, including psychological warfare planning.

(b) A study on psychological warfare vulnerabilities should be based on the primary factors of strengths and weaknesses inherent in various peoples. This initially should be developed without concern for political orientation, and only later integrated with political, military and economic programs as appropriate.

3. If, however, the recommendation in paragraph 2 above cannot be accepted, the following specific recommendations are made:

(a) Page 1, Section 3, third line - After "additional" insert "(but not rashly undertaken)." This addition would eliminate any suggestion that armed conflict, in the Soviet view, is on a par with other means of conducting the Communist-Capitalist struggle and as easily or lightly undertaken.

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(b) Page 3, Section 6, seventh line - Delete "by atomic bombardment or instance." It is questionable whether atomic bombardment would cause disintegration or closer cohesion of the Russian people.

(c) Page 4, Section 7 - Delete "vast" in the sixth line. Delete "thoroughly hostile" in the seventh line and substitute therefor "nationalistic, and large proportions resent the domination of." This change would bring the statement more in line with the statement in Section 8 that resentments exist in varying degrees.

(d) Page 5, Section 9, and Page 11, Section 17 - Reconsider statements on Korea in the light of current events.

(e) Page 5, Section 10, first paragraph, last sentence - Delete. It is considered questionable whether preparation for the "final conflict" represents the "highest priority task."

(f) Page 7, Section 11, first paragraph, last sentence - Delete "It is probable that most of Indochina will" and substitute therefor: "Most of Indochina may."

(g) Page 7, Section 11, second paragraph - Insert as a third sentence: "It is unlikely, however, that Thailand would accommodate to the USSR unless the current Phibun Government were overthrown -- which seems unlikely at present." Delete the last sentence in the paragraph. (It is believed that Thai attitude would depend partly on the degree of Western support).

(h) Page 8, Section 12, last paragraph, first sentence - Re-examine this statement in the light of Tito's recent statement that Yugoslavia would honor her UN obligations (i.e., not remain neutral) in the event of Soviet aggression in Europe even though such aggression were not directed immediately at Yugoslavia.

(i) Page 9, second paragraph, sixth line - Before "few Germans" insert "With the exception of many German industrialists."

R. N. Rogers

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By direction